Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., left, and Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., leave a Republican caucus on Capitol Hill in Washington, Feb. 2, 2011.

Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., left, and Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., leave a Republican caucus on Capitol Hill in Washington, Feb. 2, 2011. Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP

Will Politics Kill a Deal on Iran?

Impossibly high Republican demands are just a partisan attack to prevent Obama from achieving anything resembling a victory. By Joe Cirincione

If it were left to the negotiators, we would have a deal already. Those close to the talks say that they have crafted technical solutions that can prevent Iran from using its program to build a bomb and verify any attempt to cheat.

The track record is encouraging. Iran has fully complied with the interim agreement negotiated last November. For the first time in a decade, progress on the program has been halted and even reversed. Iran has stopped enriching uranium over 5 percent and eliminated the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned 2 years ago could give Iran the core material for a bomb within “weeks.”

Iran is further away from a bomb today than before this interim deal. The nuclear sites are under unprecedented inspections. Some issues of compliance have arisen, but have been resolved. A comprehensive agreement could provide verifiable assurance that Iran’s program remains non-military, and impose intrusive inspections to provide substantial warning of cheating, break-out or “sneak-out.”

The main problems are political. Hardliners in Iran and the United States remain opposed to any deal.

The favored approach to Iran’s program is reminiscent of Rome’s approach to Carthage: the entire program must be razed to the ground, never to grow again... The problem is that you cannot get that deal.

“My brothers, we are in danger,” one Iranian hardliner told a conference audience as they watched a video portraying Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his negotiators “as gullible tools of the United States,” reports Thomas Erdrink for The New York Times. They fear that a deal would be the beginning of a fundamental shift in society, triggering other reforms. This, indeed, is precisely why many Iranian human rights advocates support a deal as a critical first step to realize their reform goals.

There are signs that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may have reined in this opposition, at least for now. Revolutionary Guard leaders have recently expressed support for the negotiators.

President Obama could only wish for such power. His political opponents seem a mirror image of Rouhani’s, portraying Obama as a vainglorious fool, desperate to get a deal. They are whipping up a frenzy of activity to block any agreement.

While some Democrats are critical of a deal, increasingly this is shaping up as a partisan attack to prevent Obama from achieving anything resembling a victory. This strategy brought the GOP control of the Senate and it might work to assure further gains in 2016.

Thus, 43 U.S. Senators wrote to Obama last week—all Republicans. The letter by Sens. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., and Mark Kirk, R-Ill, blasts an agreement that hasn’t even been written yet as “a weak and dangerous deal which will prove unacceptable to the American people.”

To be acceptable, they say, the agreement must require Iran “to dismantle its illicit nuclear infrastructure and completely disclose its past work on nuclear weaponization.”  

Eleven senators-elect also wrote the president. Again, all Republicans. They also demanded that the deal “eliminates their nuclear program and all future nuclear capabilities.”

The tactic of these attacks and similar ones raised by conservative and neoconservative groups is to raise impossibly high standards for the deal. The favored approach to Iran’s program is reminiscent of Rome’s approach to Carthage: the entire program must be razed to the ground, never to grow again.

I think [the Iran nuclear agreement] is the worst deal since Munich.
Charles Krauthammer

On the one hand, this demand is correct. The best way to avoid any military use of a civilian nuclear program is to eliminate the program entirely. The problem is that you cannot get that deal. There is not a politician in Iran that could agree to completely destroy the machines Iran has given up so much to build. If they did, they wouldn’t be in power very long. 

Opponents are now piling on more impossible demands, including that Iran confess to all suspected past activities as a precondition to any deal. Full disclosure is necessary eventually, but it will likely take years, as it has with other countries that have given up nuclear programs. Most experts believe it is more important to stop Iran’s program now, and more important to know what Iran will be able to do after 2014 than to know all they may have done before 2003. 

Some opponents are more direct about their ultimate aims. The White House could “give up on diplomacy and pre-emptively strike Iran’s nuclear sites,” say Reuel Marc Gerecht and Mark Dubowitz. Ann Coulter thinks “Iraq was a magnificent war,” while Bill Kristol says the “one great failure of the Bush administration was its second-term fecklessness with respect to Iran,” and urges “regime change in Iran.”

They do not hesitate to play the appeasement card. “I think the deal is a catastrophe,” writes Charles Krauthammer, “I think it is the worst deal since Munich.”

This pressure is felt on the negotiators. One of the main sticking points is how many centrifuges Iran will be allowed to operate. Iran seems willing to cut down from the 10,000 they now have operating, but they can’t go so low as to seem to have given up too much. The other nations, including the United States, are willing to allow several thousand to operate, but can’t go so high as to seem to have given too much.

This obsession with the numbers of centrifuges is misplaced, as Scott Peterson writes in the Christian Science Monitor. Iran’s centrifuges are based on an old 1970’s Pakistani design. If it ran all 19,000 centrifuges (the 10,000 operating, plus 9,000 installed but not operating now) for one full year, he says, “They would still only produce what the European nuclear fuel company Urenco yields in five hours.”

It is highly unlikely that Iran would use known, inspected centrifuges to produce material for a bomb. A far greater danger is a covert program, something a comprehensive deal that provides intrusive inspections would help detect.

(Related: This Is the Roadmap for Closing a Nuclear Deal With Iran)

“There is no logic to the parties’ positions,” International Crisis Group expert Ali Vaez tells Peterson.  “Would one consider 10,000 centrifuges that are under constant monitoring of the IAEA a threat to world peace? Absolutely not. What is the use of 10,000 centrifuges operating? Absolutely nothing.”

Logic and fair debate is little heard in Congress these days. Show hearings are packed with deal opponents. National security concerns are pushed aside for short-term political gain.

“Oh no, it wasn’t the airplanes,” Carl Denham tells reporters at the end of King Kong, “It was beauty that killed the beast.”  If the talks in Vienna fail to reach an agreement to contain Iran’s nuclear program, it won’t be the fault of the negotiators. It will be politics that killed the deal.

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.