alice-photo via Shutterstock

The Dead Metaphors of National Security

To grapple with today’s complex security environment, we must first think about it realistically. Our terminology — not our technology — is key.

When the U.S. national security community thinks about language, often the first things—not surprisingly—that come to mind are foreign languages. Much less often it thinks about its own language (for example, its habitually sloppy use of terms such as “strategic” and “complexity.”) Rarer yet is any deeper consideration of its common metaphors, those linguistic devices that can illuminate one thing by framing it in terms of another.

Consider a few examples: the Iron Curtain, the Cold War, containment, nation-building, and the War on Drugs. Even this short list demonstrates what a central and powerful role metaphors play in the national security discourse. Indeed, many are now so widely accepted and used that they are no longer even recognized as metaphors. These “dead metaphors” are often so deeply ingrained (like the term “ingrained” here) that they tend to rise above scrutiny. Moreover—and worse—they too easily get repurposed and misapplied to new and fundamentally different issues.

This would not matter if metaphors were “just” figures of speech or “merely” issues of semantics—a status to which they are often mistakenly relegated. But they are not. To the contrary, metaphors are key to our thinking in that they are nothing less than linguistic manifestations of mental models. That is to say, they reflect, reinforce and shape our thinking—whether we realize it or not. So, if we employ a bad metaphor, it means we have a bad mental model. Potentially then—and perhaps even likely—we set ourselves up for misunderstanding, confusion and surprise. (Arab Spring anyone?)

With that in mind we need to take a deeper look at the metaphors that have long dominated our discourse: inertia, momentum, tension, leverage, stability, trajectory, center of gravity, friction, etc. All of these terms are borrowed from Newtonian mechanics. They arguably made for useful metaphors when narrowly applied to the behavioral dynamics of the USSR (closed, clear-edged, hierarchical, top-down) or Cold War (a largely two-body problem), both of which tended to behave according to the rules of Newtonian mechanics. That is to say: linearly and predictably.

However, by 1992, the Soviet Union had collapsed, China had begun to rapidly open up, and—perhaps most importantly—the internet had taken off. The national security landscape of the United States became less discrete and much more networked, meaning that the behavioral dynamics of its features became much less mechanistic. This new security environment was accompanied by all the behavioral unpredictability associated with living beings rather than the predictability of machines. Consequently, it demanded new, more organic metaphors and models—drawing, for example, from the life and environmental sciences—in order to effectively accommodate the increased uncertainty associated with living things.

Common Linear/Mechanical Metaphors
Trajectory Leverage/Levers Recoil
Tension Backlash Shape
Inertia Linchpin (Security) Vacuum
Momentum Pivot Stability
Uni/Bi/Multi-polar Center of Gravity Balance (of Power)

Unfortunately, our continued use of legacy metaphors, especially when applied to the broader strategic environment, has just reinforced our old and now unrealistic mindsets and expectations. In particular, those Newtonian metaphors are fortifying our assumptions and expectations that today’s security environment will demonstrate the same attractive, linear attributes—reducibility; clear cause and effect; repeatability; and proportionality of input/output—that characterized the Cold War environment and gave it a comforting manageability and predictability. In turn, it is no wonder that we are so readily perplexed by this new, much less manageable or predictable security environment, characterized by emergent behaviors quite different from those of the previous era.

Examples of Nonlinear Metaphors
Risk Factors Vulnerability Virulence
Acute/Chronic Diagnosis/Prognosis Toxicity
Side Effects Immunity Fog
Ripeness Contagion Dormant
Susceptibility Symptomatic Evolutionary

If we are ever to think realistically about—never mind successfully deal with—the behavioral dynamics of this new environment, we will need to start characterizing that environment more accurately. We will need to use metaphors drawn from more organic disciplines such as meteorology, biology, and epidemiology.

Interestingly, there was a scholarly discussion about this issue (some of it hyperlinked above) just beginning to take off in the aftermath of the Cold War. Unfortunately, 9/11 relegated it, and so many other important discussions, to the same warehouse as Indiana Jones’s lost ark. It is long past time that we pull the discussion out and finally give it its appropriate due.

This might not be quite as hard as it sounds. Possibly due to some growing implicit awareness that today’s highly interconnected security dynamics do, in fact, behave quite differently, there are glimmers of such organic metaphors (e.g., viral ideas, policy side-effects and economic contagion) beginning to appear in the national security discourse. Though certainly a positive development, such organic metaphors unfortunately still appear to be much rarer than the mechanistic ones, which seemingly remain the default.

That said, we should not kid ourselves that this will be easy. Discussion of this topic in countless analytic training courses that I’ve conducted suggests that intelligence officers, even when they understand and accept the need for new metaphors, will often seek a distinct replacement term that can just be swapped out for an old metaphor. But it’s not that simple. Since it is not just a matter of terms—but also concepts—it is almost always necessary to think more deliberately and then change the larger text so it accurately portrays the concept in question. Moreover, it is common for editors and other reviewers, when encountering these new metaphors, to see them as awkward and to try to change them back to older, more familiar—but less suitable—terms. 

Developing and using truly appropriate metaphors can and will be challenging. It takes real attention to what is too often automatic. It is important to consider if a metaphor—no matter how commonly employed or normal it sounds—truly reflects our understanding of the issue to which it is applied. If an old metaphor works for an issue—fine, use it. But familiar terminology, however comfortable must not be permitted to undermine sound thinking.

In sum, the national security community needs to constantly ask itself what it really thinks and what it is really trying to say, and then use metaphors appropriate to the case. For only by doing this will it stop allowing its traditional and comfortable language to put words in its mouth and—worse—poorly conceived thoughts in its head.

Although this article is derived in part from research conducted at the National Intelligence University, all statements of fact, analysis, or opinion expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the U.S. government, or any other component thereof.

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.