In this June 16, 2014 file photo, demonstrators chant pro-Islamic State group, slogans as they carry the group's flags in front of the provincial government headquarters in Mosul, Iraq.

In this June 16, 2014 file photo, demonstrators chant pro-Islamic State group, slogans as they carry the group's flags in front of the provincial government headquarters in Mosul, Iraq. AP Photo/Manu Brabo, File

The Current US Approach to Terror Is a Recipe for Forever War

Defusing terrorist groups requires helping the communities they exploit, not just shooting their leaders.

Without minimizing the bravery and tradecraft that went into killing Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, chasing down terrorist leaders without helping the communities they prey on is a recipe for prolonging, not ending, the war on terror.

Salafi-jihadi groups such as Baghdadi’s Islamic State insinuate their way into communities made vulnerable by local conditions: bad governance, grievances, or external threats. The success of these groups is driven far less by some figurehead who releases occasional exhortations than by their ability to provide physical security, governance, and sustenance. Across the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia, there are people who take what the Salafi-jihadis have to offer because they have no choice.

Related: Killing Terrorist Leaders Gets Attention, But It Doesn’t Stop Terrorism

Related: Sunni Jihad Is Going Local

Related: DHS’s New Counterterrorism Strategy Reflects Professionalism, Not Politics

In Iraq, al Qaeda reconstituted from the remnants of its organization to form what would later become the Islamic State. The very Iraqi communities that had fought hard with the U.S. against al Qaeda accepted demonstrators waving the black flag at their protests in early 2013. Sunni Iraqis from Anbar province were calling for the removal of then Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, a Shia who strengthened his own power by sidelining Sunni rivals. The marginalization of Iraqi Sunni drove some to support—or at least tolerate—what would become the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

In Syria, al Qaeda-linked Salafi-jihadi groups defended communities opposed to the Assad regime from brutal oppression and attacks. Unlike Western countries, these groups came to the aid of the Syrian opposition. They fought on the frontlines and brought fighting experience and operational organization. They helped to protect and maintain critical infrastructure, sought to meet the basic survival needs of the population, and provided governance through local courts and councils. The groups grew stronger as the communities began to depend on them. 

When some members of Syrian Salafi-jihadi groups began training for attacks on the United States, U.S. military forces struck. But killing that band of plotters only removes one immediate threat. The local conditions endure, providing fertile ground for Salafi-jihadi groups. Eventually, some group is going to evade detection long enough to gather and deploy enough resources to outdo the 9/11 attackers.

The U.S. strategy against the Islamic State, al Qaeda, and similar groups emphasizes the terror threats these groups pose and leaders and networks behind those threats. Big kills of prominent leaders reinforce a false narrative that the likes of Baghdadi and Osama bin Laden are the source of the threat. Their groups—and the Salafi-jihadi movement of which those groups are part—are more than the individual on top or the external attack cells. All groups have survived the death of a leader—and some, such as the predecessor of the Islamic State, thrived under the new personality.

Counterterrorism operations do nothing to fill the gaps in security and governance that drive vulnerable communities into the arms of Salafi-jihadists. The Obama administration’s prioritization of the counter-ISIS fight in Syria over the resolution of the Syrian Civil War enabled al Qaeda’s and other Salafi-jihadi groups’ expansion. The Trump administration’s reduction of U.S. engagement in Syria to counterterrorism and a token force in defense of the oil sets conditions for groups like ISIS to re-expand.

The global war on terror has become an endless war because the U.S. has yet to adopt an approach that will defeat the Salafi-jihadi groups at the heart of this terror threat. The cycle of military deployments—costly in both American blood and treasure—will not end so long as the conditions remain.

If the United States really wants to take the fight to the Islamic State or al Qaeda, it or its partners must out-compete them to fill the needs of their “constituents.” Providing communities with a viable alternative to the Salafi-jihadi groups reduces the groups’ influence and weakens its ability to operate. This will no doubt require some military force — to provide security, for example — but the U.S. military will be one of the first to ask for a broader strategy with the Defense Department in support, not in the lead.

The U.S. must shift to a civilian-led strategic approach that uses foreign assistance and other elements of soft power to strengthen communities at risk of or under Salafi-jihadi penetration. Such an approach seeks to restore the ability of communities to reject Salafi-jihadi overtures, and relegate them to the fringes where defeating them will be a more straightforward counterterrorism mission. 

Paying once to improve conditions by strengthening local communities’ resilience will yield dividends in the future. Killing terrorist leaders feels great, but if that’s all there is, it means we’ll be back again, and again. And that is a true forever war. 

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.