Treat operational feedback as a strategic resource, new paper argues

As the Pentagon overhauls its acquisition system, it should take lessons from recent and ongoing wars, a new report argues.

From Israel, the U.S. should learn that “operational feedback should be treated as a strategic resource.” writes Barak Seener, an associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, in a report released Monday. And from Ukraine, the U.S. can learn “the strategic value of competition, decentralization, and commercial innovation.”

Additionally, Seener writes, “software-defined warfare requires software-defined acquisition.” In the future, acquisition models should “treat software as a continuously developing capability, rather than a completed product.” 

These changes and more are necessary, he writes, because: “Future military advantage will belong to organizations that can learn, adapt, and integrate faster than their adversaries.” 

Acknowledging the reforms the Pentagon began in 2025, Seener writes that the main challenge facing the American defense acquisition process “is not simply one of speed. It is the ability to align authority, responsibility, and operational outcomes within a single decision-making structure.” 

Introducing portfolio acquisition executives is a good step, he writes, but “the effectiveness of the reform will ultimately depend upon the degree to which portfolio managers are able to exercise genuine authority over requirements, resources, capability trade-offs and program termination.”

In an interview, Seener pointed to the ways militiaries are using adaptation to outflank exquisite weaponry.

“We used to think that you needed very expensive platforms that took a decade to create, like the F-35, to create strategic impact on the battlefield,” he said. “But look what Ukraine is doing in Russia. Look what the Houthis are doing, just by deploying mass.”

“Technology is evolving much faster than traditional defense acquisition timelines,” he said, “so expensive platforms that take years to develop can leave capabilities outdated by a rapidly changing battlefield landscape before they are fielded.”

Instead of developing bespoke technologies from scratch, “the Pentagon can increase its flexibility by tapping into technologies already developed by the commercial sector—particularly AI, software, cloud computing, autonomy, sensors, and data analytics,” he said.

The need for further reform is clear, Seener said, when you look at how existing systems “have failed to make a strategic impact in Iran.

“You know, in the first couple of days, America and Israel together were able to decapitate the regime, eliminate their command and control, with this rapid tempo, this high velocity of strikes against a huge number of targets, which was unprecedented. And yet it made no strategic impact. Everybody was dazzled; they were awe-inspired at the impact it made…but look, the regime remains intact. Their missile capability remains intact. So this operational wowing effect that it has is not the same as having the strategic impact.”