During the Flintlock 2023 exercise hosted by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, Niger Special Operation Force Soldiers pull security on a simulated village near Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, March 4, 2023.

During the Flintlock 2023 exercise hosted by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, Niger Special Operation Force Soldiers pull security on a simulated village near Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, March 4, 2023. U.S. Army / Cpl. Clara Soria-Hernandez

Time to change US policy toward Niger and its West African neighbors

There are three main problems—including that it's not working.

The coup in Niger last week should be a wake-up call for U.S. policymakers: the current approach to security in West Africa isn’t working. The United States is using too much force against too little threat in the region. Leaders must resist the temptation to escalate in the current crisis. Instead, they should draw down forces from Niger, limit missions to reconnaissance, and focus on peacemaking in conflict zones. 

Today, there are about 1,100 U.S. soldiers in Niger on two bases. These troops are the centerpiece to a decade-long U.S. effort to fight terrorist groups affiliated with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Niger and West Africa generally. U.S. special forces train, assist, and accompany Nigerien forces on combat missions against local jihadists. These missions are not risk-free for U.S. soldiers. In 2017, four U.S. commandos died in an ambush near Tongo Tongo. 

There are three problems with U.S. policy toward West Africa. 

First, U.S. force against these groups is unnecessary, for they lack the intent and capability to attack the United States. Their affiliations with ISIS or al-Qaeda are generally meant to increase recruits and raise their profile, not gather resources to strike the West. Their records tell the tale, experts say: groups that strike only regionally pose no global threat. No West African terrorist group has ever planned or attempted a strike against the United States or its allies. ISIS in Greater SaharaAnsaroul Islam, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin have been around for nearly a decade, but they attack targets only in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. These groups aren’t global menaces to U.S. security. Instead, they are insurgencies with local interests centered on toppling local governments. And yet, U.S. troops are in harm’s way fighting wars against them. 

Second, U.S. policy isn’t working in West Africa. Despite U.S. troops’ valiant efforts, terrorism has exploded in the region since U.S. operations began there in 2013. Terrorist attacks in the region increased seven-fold between 2017 and 2020. Last year, attacks increased by 36 percent regionally and 43 percent in Niger alone, a point Niger’s military used to justify last week’s coup. In short, U.S. forces are on the frontlines of a perilous losing cause in West Africa.

And third, the potential for U.S. escalation runs high. U.S. partners in the Economic Community of West African States have applied sanctions and are threatening military intervention to reverse last week’s coup. Direct U.S. military participation here is unlikely. But if ECOWAS succeeds in reversing the coup (by sanctions or force), the United States will inevitably help with the domestic stabilization efforts that follow. In short, Washington could be headed toward nation-building in a place—Niger—where it has no strategic interests. That isn’t good for U.S. national security.

What should U.S. policymakers do? 

First, the United States should withdraw its troops from Niger and end advise/assist/accompany missions for U.S. special operators in West Africa. Too little threat and the danger of escalation today justify retrenchment. 

Second, the United States should move the airbase in Niger to a more stable West African country—perhaps, Ghana or Senegal—and limit its efforts to gathering intelligence that could help indicate when a West African terrorist group might become a global-reach threat. If such transitions occur, the base could also be used for necessary future strikes, like the one that killed ISIS leader Bilal al-Sidani earlier this year in Somalia.

Finally, if the United States really wants to help West Africa, it needs to center policy on the local dynamics of West African conflicts. This requires greater attention not to force but humanitarian aid and peacebuilding, which would deliver more help at far lower cost.  

The coup in Niger offers an important opportunity to adjust current U.S. policy in West Africa. Let’s hope policymakers have the imagination and courage to seize the moment. 

C. William “Will” Walldorf, Jr. is Associate Professor and Shivley Family Faculty Fellow at Wake Forest University as well as a Visiting Fellow at Defense Priorities.

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.