In this 2015 photo, Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, shakes hands with Pakistan President Mamnoon Hussain at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.

In this 2015 photo, Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, shakes hands with Pakistan President Mamnoon Hussain at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Lintao Zhang/AP

Don’t Fear Pakistan’s Participation in China’s ‘New Silk Road’

U.S. interests can be served no matter whether the mega-project’s subcontinental branch succeeds or fails.

Almost 30 heads of state will gather in Beijing this weekend for the “Belt and Road” Forum, the annual conference about the Chinese mega-project to build highways and railroads to the farthest parts of the Eurasian land mass. By some measures, it’s China’s biggest diplomatic event of the year. But the United States and many of its allies will send junior delegations — and India will be conspicuously absent. This reflects caution, if not outright apprehension, about the overall Belt and Road Initiative, and in particular the $50 billion “flagship” portion called the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC.

While CPEC reveals China’s model for geopolitical influence, U.S. policymakers need not overreact nor feel compelled to counter it. There are essentially two possible outcomes: success or failure. Either could advance or create opportunities for the United States.

The apprehension turns on worries that CPEC may increase support of Pakistan’s civil nuclear program, help China expand its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and generally undermine south Asian stability by emboldening Islamabad to aggressive behavior or even fostering a “quiet cold war” in India-China relations.

Another concern is that CPEC may provide cover for building up Pakistan’s dual-use seaport of Gwadar to support Chinese naval operations. Yet astute analysts point out that China remains a long way from fulfilling such power-projection ambitions, and that its lines of communication to the Indian Ocean can be held at risk by the U.S. and Indian navies. Moreover, a base at Gwadar would not solve China’s Strait of Malacca dilemma, as it remains vulnerable to a blockade or land chokepoints that could be threatened; facilitate much in the way of anti-access and area-denial efforts; nor allow the stalking of Indian second-strike nuclear submarines.

But if CPEC succeeds — that is, helps Pakistan meet its energy, commerce, and economic growth projections — the resulting prosperity will help Islamabad face challenges such as a youth bulge, climate change, unemployment, radicalization, and the need to upgrade social services. It will also show, for the first time in a country that associates better economic stewardship with military dictatorship, that serious economic growth can happen under civilian leaders. All this would increase Pakistan’s stability, increasing in turn the prospects for a stable region, a core U.S. interest.

And while some worry that CPEC investments will embolden Pakistan, this kind of international economic engagement may incentivize more risk-averse and responsible behavior. CPEC-related growth depends on foreign investors who may shy away from a country where terrorist organizations operate and cross-border conflicts routinely flare up. One of the quietest periods along the disputed Line of Control — 2004 to 2007 — coincided with Pakistan’s highest economic growth rates in three decades. Some even credit Pakistan’s recent house arrest of Lashkar-e-Taiba leader Hafiz Saeed to threats by the Financial Action Task Force that would have exposed major deficiencies on terror financing and sent worrying signals to the markets.

Finally, deeper investments in Pakistan would increase China’s influence but also its exposure and sensitivity to risky behavior by Islamabad. If thousands of Chinese workers living in and traveling to Pakistan are exposed to terrorist threats, it could finally motivate Beijing to press Islamabad to demobilize such groups. One hint of this was last fall’s leaked account of Chinese leaders beginning to question their Pakistani counterparts on the prudence of providing cover for the Jaish-e-Mohammad group.

A secondary effect of CPEC success is that it could motivate India to compete more actively for regional influence. It might, for example, catalyze reforms to defense budgeting, procurement, and joint operations. It could also propel greater cooperation with smaller neighbors and greater U.S.-India cooperation through foundational agreements and joint patrols with the U.S. Navy. These Indian responses would advance our Asia strategy by enhancing geopolitical pluralism and balancing Chinese influence.

And what if CPEC fails — that is, does not live up to “much-hyped” expectations of economic gains for Pakistan and strategic returns for China? This still presents certain opportunities for the United States.

CPEC is fundamentally a bundle of loans, the most recent of which sent $1.2 billion to Pakistan to prevent a foreign-exchange crisis. Failure may ensnare Pakistan in the “China debt trap,” unable to repay loans and forced to hand over equity. The resulting friction could render Pakistan more cooperative with the United States. Beyond Pakistan, other small and medium-sized states could become warier of Chinese investment. This in turn would make India and Japan more competitive as an alternative regional source of development.

Chances are CPEC will result in both some success and shortcomings. If approached in a dispassionate manner and deftly managed by American strategists and diplomats, any of the outcomes can be turned to U.S. advantage.

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.