This Wednesday, Feb. 7, 2018 file photo, shows American troops looking toward the border with Turkey from a small outpost near the town of Manbij, northern Syria.

This Wednesday, Feb. 7, 2018 file photo, shows American troops looking toward the border with Turkey from a small outpost near the town of Manbij, northern Syria. Susannah George/AP

The US Is Drifting Toward War With a NATO Ally

It's not too late to stem Turkey's turn toward Russia — and defuse a World War I-style conflict.

While the White House is distracted by internal turmoil, a crisis is brewing in Syria. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and its proxy force, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), recently invaded the city of Afrin to rid it of “terrorists,” destabilizing the de facto autonomous Kurdish region and endangering U.S. policy. Last Tuesday, in order to defend an allied Kurd-dominated militia, and in the wake of reports that Assad may once more be using chemical weapons, the U.S.-led coalition killed over 100 Syrian regime soldiers. Over the weekend, the Israeli Air Force downed an Iranian drone launched from a Syrian base, which led to a broader skirmish that brought down an Israeli F-16 and destroyed nearly half of the Syrian regime’s air defenses.

With a complex system of alliances, a major World War I-style conflict is on the horizon, one that has the potential to spread across the Middle East. With the near-demise of ISIS, buffering territory is dwindling, and thus the prospect of a conflagration is increasing. Meanwhile, the existential struggle taking place in the White House means that this Administration either cannot, or will not, give international and national security the attention it deserves.

Operation Olive Branch, Turkey’s latest offensive in Afrin, is a tangible sign of its drift from NATO and its increasing alignment with Russia. With the Kremlin’s blessing, the TSK is now battling the U.S.-led coalition’s allied Syrian ground forces. When the operation continues to Manjib, as Erdoğan repeatedly insists it will, the TSK could come face-to-face with American troops. The few hundred U.S. Special Operations soldiers stationed in Manjib have vowed that America will stay and support its allies. Given the deterioration in relations between the U.S. and Turkey, it is imaginable that for the first time, war could break out between two NATO member states.

American support for Kurdish forces is only one of several critical factors that has strained U.S.-Turkish relations. After the botched coup of 2016, Turkey purged its entire staff of NATO representatives, nearly 400 military officials. In July 2017, the Turkish state-run news organization, Anadolu, revealed the location of 10 U.S. bases in northern Syria, endangering American troops and undermining their operations. In late August 2017, Turkish-backed forces fired at U.S. troops in northern Syria. In December 2017, Turkey finalized the purchase of the S-400 missile-defense system from Russia. Ankara has also objected to NATO member-state access to key Turkish bases such as İncirlik.

These and other actions show Turkey’s increasing alignment with Russia’s anti-NATO campaign. Russia is attempting to enlist Turkey in its grander strategy of “unwinding the U.S.-led global order,” with a particular focus on disrupting NATO. The Kremlin’s campaign to win hearts and minds in Turkey, complete with anti-NATO propaganda concerning the attempted coup of 2016, appears to be working. Polls show that both anti-Americanism and pro-Russian sentiment are on the rise in Turkey.

It is still possible to salvage the relationship between Turkey and the West, and to distance Turkey from its Russian benefactor. The U.S. has leverage over Turkey, especially with respect to the Kurdish issue, as Russia is so far ignoring Erdoğan’s demand to shut out the Kurds from its own Syrian peace efforts. President Trump could simultaneously alleviate Turkish concerns while securing American interests by engaging in careful diplomacy with Turkey. Future U.S. concessions with respect to allied Kurdish ground forces in Syria should be conditioned on Turkey’s willingness to (1) halt delivery of its $2.5 billion purchase from Russia of the S-400 system; and (2) cease coordinating military drills with Russia.

If Erdoğan agrees to stipulations that distance Turkey from Russia, the U.S. should explore cooperating with the Turkish-backed FSA and decoupling the Kurdish YPG (People’s Protection Units) from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Coordinating the deployment of FSA and Arab fighters in the SDF near the Turkish border would likely placate Erdoğan, but still leave room for the U.S. to continue supporting the YPG in areas where Turkish national security is not at risk.

Putin’s unchecked courtship of Erdoğan increases the risks associated with any military response to Assad’s war crimes, continued Turkish aggression, or Iranian entrenchment in Syria. The U.S. and NATO should take Turkey to task for any actions that are detrimental to NATO’s mutual defense goals.  Concurrently, Turkey must be lured away from Russia before it is too late. The delicate carrot-and-stick balance that must be struck with Turkey to solidify its fidelity to NATO interests requires highly-skilled diplomacy. The ineptitude of the current Administration means Congress must take the lead. It must do so immediately, lest we end up in an international armed conflict that we are ill-equipped to handle.


The authors explore these developments more deeply in Turkey's Eastern Pivot: A Challenge for NATO and a Threat to U.S. National Security, published in January by the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of Pennsylvania. 

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.