Rose Gottemoeller, then Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, joined Anatoly Antonov, then Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, in a side event at the 2013 NPT Prepcom in Geneva.

Rose Gottemoeller, then Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, joined Anatoly Antonov, then Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, in a side event at the 2013 NPT Prepcom in Geneva. U.S. Mission Geneva / Eric Bridiers

America, You're Not Listening to Us

Russia’s ambassador: We’re ready for urgently needed security dialogue — when our U.S. counterparts are ready to engage in good faith.

You can’t have a conversation if one party won’t listen to the other.

Looking back on the discussions at the annual International Nuclear Policy Conference, hosted last month in Washington, D.C, by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, we have a strong feeling that all reasonable U.S. experts recognize an urgent lack of dialogue between Russia and the United States on key international security issues. As a result of this vacuum created in recent years, the number of unresolved problems continues to multiply — and therefore, so does the potential for conflict and the risks for global stability. 

This issue grows more relevant as the United States reconsiders its attitude towards the international system of strategic stability agreements. As Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted on March 20 in his statement to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, “The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and now from the INF Treaty, paves a way to a large-scale arms race with unpredictable consequences.” The realities of today’s rapid technological progress suggest that such a race will occur, because many countries aspire to have their own nuclear and missile capabilities as the sole true guarantors of their national security.

So it is quite surprising that the Western national-security community sometimes acts as if they do not wish to hear our arguments. Let’s take the INF Treaty, for instance. A quick reminder: U.S. allies in NATO abandoned their own security interests and blindly supported Washington’s unfounded accusations that Russia has “violated” the Treaty. The alleged proof presented so far by the United States—coordinates and dates of the “banned” missile tests—is absolutely insufficient for such grave accusations. If there is more evidence, it should be presented. Without it, all U.S. accusations made against us once again prove that Washington lacks arguments to back its biased stance. Meanwhile, our attempts to save the Treaty, including by proposing unprecedented transparency measures, are rejected by the Trump administration.

Related: New New START a Nonstarter: Russian Ambassador

Related: Russia Is Turning Up Its Nuclear Rhetoric. That’s a Problem

Related: ‘Chaos Serves Putin’s Interest’: A Veteran Diplomat Takes Stock

Not to mention that according to the information at our disposal, the United States has been violating the Treaty for 20 years now. In 1999, they first tested combat unmanned aerial vehicles that have the same characteristics as land-based cruise missiles banned by the Treaty. The United States went on to use ballistic target missiles for testing their missile defense system and, in 2014, they began to deploy in Europe the Mk 41 vertical launching systems. These launchers are fully suitable, without any substantial modifications, for Tomahawk intermediate-range attack missiles. And this is a clear violation of the Treaty. Launchers of this kind have already been deployed in Romania and it looks like next year they will be deployed in Poland.


Related podcast:

Everyone seems to be OK with Washington’s unilateral efforts to scrap one of the most successful disarmament treaties in history — two entire classes of missiles were eliminated — which fully met the interests of European security. As if nobody wants to treat seriously a very much real threat of new intermediate- and shorter-range missiles fielded in Europe. It is to be regretted that the lessons of the 1980s seem to have been erased from the memory of the Europeans, who chose not to support our efforts to preserve the INF Treaty at the United Nations General Assembly. We do not wish to escalate tensions. As President Vladimir Putin said during his Feb. 2 meeting with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Russia will not deploy intermediate- and short-range missiles, unless such U.S.-made weapons appear in Europe or in other regions of the world. We will act reciprocally and only to counter U.S. actions. Our response is outlined in a way that will not draw the Russian Federation into a costly arms race. 

Another flagrant example of unwillingness to hear us is the notion that our nuclear doctrine includes an “escalate to de-escalate” concept that includes the possibility of a first “limited low-yield nuclear strike.” This belief is held widely enough to be mentioned in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018. Clearly, this allegation does not withstand criticism. All those who doubt it could have a look at Article 27 of the Russian Military Doctrine. It plainly states that our country “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, and in case of an aggression against it with conventional weapons that would put in danger the very existence of the state.” Therefore, as Vladimir Putin said, “our strategy does not include a preemptive use of nuclear weapons…Our concept is a retaliatory counter-strike.” 

Recalling questions voiced during the Conference, I have an impression that our stance on the New START needs to be clarified.

We hope that the New START will not suffer the same fate as the INF Treaty. It expires in 2021. On many occasions we have declared our readiness to discuss the possibility of its extension for another five years. Washington, however, still cannot give a definite answer. 

It is useful to recall that the extension of the New START is not a simple technicality that could be done in a couple of weeks. Serious issues must first be resolved. The American side must fully settle Russian concerns that the United States has met the accord’s limits not only by actually reducing the number of affected weapons, but also by converting a certain number of them in a way the Russian Federation still cannot confirm their incapability of employing nuclear weapons, as specified by the Treaty. 

One can certainly hope that there’s still time. Although the less time we have, the higher the risks of ending up in a situation when there will be no legal limitations of nuclear arsenals for the first time in 50 years. Such a turn of events would be extremely dangerous in a time of overall bilateral crisis and dismantlement of the whole arms control regime.

We strongly adhere to our arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation obligations. Our proposals to resolve the INF issues and preserve the New START still stand. I am most confident that the efforts, required to return to an equal, professional discussion are not exhausted. But we won’t act “needy.” We’ll wait for our partners to come around and engage in a substantial dialogue on this issue of global importance. All our proposals are on the table.

NEXT STORY: Yemen Cannot Afford to Wait

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.