A 2016 photo of a German Air Force Tornado, one of the few aircraft that can drop U.S. B61 nuclear bombs.

A 2016 photo of a German Air Force Tornado, one of the few aircraft that can drop U.S. B61 nuclear bombs. Julian Herzog

The US Should Remove Its Nukes from Europe

There’s no prudent use case, and their non-stealthy fighter jets can’t deliver them anyway.

Twenty-nine years ago this month, as the Cold War was ending, President George H.W. Bush took an extraordinary step. With the exception of a contingent of air-delivered bombs in Europe, he unilaterally withdrew from the field all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Although he had strong reason to believe that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev might reciprocate, Bush had no assurances. In the end, the Soviet Union (and then Russia) did begin to draw down their own massive tactical nuclear holdings. 

Today, that prudent move serves as an example. The United States still maintains some 150 B61 nuclear bombs in Europe and has also deployed a low-yield warhead, the W76-2, on submarines, marking the first time in three decades that U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are again at sea. Washington should reconsider this posture.

The United States and the Soviet Union were two scorpions in a bottle, as Robert Oppenheimer once described them – each capable of killing the other, but only at the cost of its own life. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions that ensued in Eastern Europe changed all of that. Bush had the wisdom to not only recognize this, but to understand and act on the implications for the nation’s tactical nuclear arsenal.

Yet the differences between the United States and Russia do not rise to the level of those presented by the Soviet Union. Russian policies can be both reckless and odious – from the illegal seizure of Crimea to the poisoning of Alexei Navalny – but they don’t present a global challenge to the United States or a basic threat to its way of life. Russia is a regional threat – with a number of weaknesses – that can best be met and contained through conventional means. Resort to tactical nuclear weapons therefore makes no sense – even in the event of a direct military clash with Russian forces, as, for example, could theoretically occur in the Baltic region.

The United States should therefore remove its remaining B61s and the alliance as a whole should rethink the role of tactical nuclear forces in its defense planning. Moreover, in foregoing the B61s, NATO would lose practically nothing in terms of warfighting capability. The bombs are dated anachronisms that face severe operational limitations and are also subject to a convoluted release process that would likely delay their timely employment in the event of a military crisis. 

In the particular case of a possible Baltic war, the B61s would face two specific impediments to their effective use. First, the only NATO aircraft currently certified to deliver the B61 are the non-stealthy F-16 and Tornado. Neither plane stands a reasonable chance of making it through the teeth of Russia’s advanced air defense network in northeast Europe to reach its target. Even though it is nuclear, the B61 is still a basic free-fall bomb. Its delivery aircraft must fly over the target to drop the weapon, no different than a World War II bomber.

Second, there are almost no viable targets for a tactical nuclear weapon in a Baltic war. Use on the territory of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania would essentially involve killing citizens of those countries to “save” them. None of the three are large states and even tactical nuclear employment would carry significant humanitarian and environmental consequences. Use directly against Russia also must be ruled out as it could immediately invite a strategic exchange – the worst possible outcome. Targeting Russian units that might be transiting Belarus could be another option, but it is unclear whether this would affect the Russian advance and would also entail civilian casualties among a population that isn’t even willingly participating in the war. 

In short, there is no reliable means to deliver the B61 in a Baltic contingency and practically nowhere to usefully employ them. So why keep them at all? Withdrawing the B61s unilaterally would entail far less risk than President Bush bore in 1991 as it doesn’t alter NATO’s defensive capability because the weapons are already functionally useless. 

It is worth noting that such a step would not be a panacea for relations between the alliance and Russia. There is no guarantee Moscow would reciprocate with its own reductions – in fact the odds are it won’t. But it could be a useful first step in establishing a new dialogue with Russia on strategic stability in Europe – similar to the discussions that were routinely held at various points during the Cold War, such as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks and the negotiations that led to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

The action of triggering a similar dialogue with Russia now – on reducing nuclear and other risks, including the increasing number of close calls in the air – won’t immediately yield results. But it could lay the foundation for a de-escalation of tensions between the two sides in time.

The Cold War is long over. While Russia is a problematic, capable state, it is no longer an existential threat like the Soviet Union. Promulgating nuclear policies from the past that were designed to address a different order of threat therefore makes no sense. 

Bringing the B61s home would be a first step in openly acknowledging that. It’s long past time that Oppenheimer’s “two scorpions” analogy ceased to apply.  

Mike Sweeney is a fellow at Defense Priorities and the author of Reconsidering U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe.

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.