NurPhoto via Getty Images / Nicolas Economou

Send in the Quadcopters: Arm Ukrainian Citizens with Simple Drones

Ukrainians are already using consumer-grade drones to spot Russian forces. We should send more of them.

In a recent Facebook post, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense called upon citizens in Kyiv to help monitor the city for Russian soldiers—and particularly people with drones. “Do you have a drone? Then give it to an experienced pilot! Or do you know how to fly a drone? Join the joint patrol with Unit 112 of the Kyiv City Special Brigade!” It’s a great idea with tactical and strategic implications—and the United States and allied countries should help by sending simple commercial drones and spare parts to Ukraine. It wouldn’t cost much either: cheap off-the-shelf drones available on Amazon can be less than $100 (though higher-end drones can easily run a few thousand dollars each).

Such drones allow defenders to put eyes in the air, to look above buildings, trees, and other obstructions that limit line of sight, providing priceless information about an enemy’s location and forces. Drone operators can track Russian troop movements and activities, revealing vulnerable units and supply lines. 

All this allows defenders to better plan and execute actions—the time and place for an attack, and the best locations to erect or strengthen barricades and other defenses. Situational awareness also enables more complex tactics, such as seemingly spontaneous swarming attacks in which defenders attack Russian troops with Molotov cocktails, simple sabotage operations, or just thrown rocks from all directions, then quickly disperse. Drones can also sound alarms about approaching forces, to help know where and when to run.

Of course, the information coming from a drone is put to best use by troops and leaders skilled and equipped to interpret, evaluate, and add the information into the military’s broader operating picture. But any airborne eyes are better than none for even the civil defense units that are being hastily assembled in Ukrainian cities. As fighting moves into urban areas, such groups are likely to find themselves in narrow spaces. Most groups likely lack even the most basic intelligence and surveillance capabilities of a conventional military, such as dedicated scouting units or personnel.

As U.S. forces facing the Islamic State learned, drones can do more than watch: they can be modified to drop grenades or antipersonnel weapons. Indeed, much of the Ukrainian military’s existing drone fleet consists of modified commercial drones, the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 being a notable, successful exception. (Ukrainian officials have said they have received more TB-2s since fighting started.) Armed drones would allow civil defenders to carry out attacks at much longer ranges. The use of waypoint navigation – a drone flying a predesignated path based on GPS – means defenders may effectively have fire-and-forget missiles. Of course, given limited drone payloads, the harm would be relatively small and focused on softer targets like infantry. 

But once Ukrainians demonstrate that a tiny aircraft might be carrying a lethal payload, Russian troops must worry others do too. Even without explosives, simply harassing and buzzing about Russian soldiers may distract or interfere. The soldiers may wonder if it’s a random civilian or the Ukrainian military preparing for an attack. 

And in a war that will be won as much by feeding narratives with images and video, footage captured by drones can become ammunition for the defenders’ messaging campaigns. Videos and pictures can be uploaded online easily to platforms like YouTube or Facebook. Civilian drone operators are already doing so. The larger strategic value is to encourage broader resistance to Russian forces, increase the costs for possible Russian occupation, and complexity the battlespace. (Russia’s own drones have been surprisingly absent from the conflict.)

Encouraging civilians to support the military effort necessarily puts them at risk. Civilians will typically not even have basic military training and may make simple mistakes like standing in the open when throwing a Molotov cocktail. Drones can help reduce that risk. High-end consumer drones can be flown from miles away. That allows defenders to operated them from positions of relative security. Drones could be flown from cars, trucks, or other vehicles to readily flee. 

There is some risk that using certain Chinese-made drones could help Russian forces spot Ukrainian operators. But reportedly, technology used to locate DJI drone operators only narrow to a radius of a few miles. In a crowded city, that’s meaningless. Likewise, Russian counter-drone systems may allow the same, though again it’s unclear how useful the systems are. Of course, individuals have to make their own decisions, and decide whether the risks outweigh the potential benefits. 

There are definite strategic benefits. One net strategic effect is to complexify the battlefield. While Russian forces worry about continued fighting with conventional Ukrainian forces and the inherent challenges of urban conflict, drones add one more worry. Even if the direct effects are minimal, Russia would need to devote some attention and resources, to potentially include air-defense assets. Depending on the Russian ability to respond, drones may also lower Russian morale, providing a clear illustration of the inability of Russian forces to pacify Ukraine. Enough drones could feed a belief among Russian forces of being in a panopticon in which they may be watched at any time, anywhere but never know exactly. The United States experience in the Middle East is illustrative. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, has frequently warned about how cheap drones have flooded American forces and contributed to casualties. 

Of course, the mechanics of drone provision need to be worked out a bit. Simply handing out drones on the streets of Kyiv is not the best idea. Rather, the United States should work with and through the Ukrainian military, as the military already appears to be organizing and supporting irregular forces. The military may use those networks to distribute drone assets to areas in need. The United States and allies also need to consider the type of drone, and particularly whether they have geofencing. Generally, geofencing is a good thing – it prevents drones from flying over sensitive areas like military bases or nuclear power plants– but Russian forces may be occupying those locations.

Drone delivery should also be supported with training, perhaps pointing to publicly available drone tutorials. This should include basic flight operations, and safety issues. Advanced training could cover integration of drones within broader urban and civil defense tactics. In addition, the Ukrainian military may modify or provide training on how to modify drones to carry different payloads or resist jamming or other defenses. In limited cases, the Ukrainian military may even provide bomb-laden drones to civilians, provided they trust their safety and capability. 

As everyday Ukrainians take up arms in defense of their homeland, that defense should take to the air. Send a thousand Ukrainian eyes buzzing through the sky.

Thanks to Sam Bendett for providing useful input on the essay.

NEXT STORY: Give Putin a Way Out of This

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.