The first C-17 Globemaster III arirrves at Prince Sultan Air Base during the initial bed down of Airmen, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, June 24, 2019.

The first C-17 Globemaster III arirrves at Prince Sultan Air Base during the initial bed down of Airmen, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, June 24, 2019. U.S. Air Force / Senior Airman Sean Campbell

Sending Troops Back to the Middle East Won’t Stop Iran

Knee-jerk deployments only distract from the president’s bigger priorities: China and Russia.

The Trump administration’s decision to kill Qassam Soleimani is the latest in an escalatory “maximum pressure” Iran strategy that is shifting American foreign policy attention and resources back toward the Middle East. That’s a problem. 

Nothing for a global superpower occurs in isolation. Killing the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, while morally justifiable and emotionally satisfying to us, given his role in killing Americans, has dropped a 2,000-lb bomb into the administration’s foreign policy priorities — and the blast could hurt America’s readiness to deal with greater threats. 

The Trump administration believes that the primary challenges to U.S. security and prosperity are competition and potential conflict with China and Russia. The White House’s 2018 National Security Strategy and the Pentagon’s supporting 2018 National Defense Strategy stress this and declare an intention to shift the U.S. military away from the Middle East. Reasonable people might disagree as to the president’s personal commitment to the particulars of these strategies, but he has been consistent about expressing his desire to end “forever wars” and pushing back harder against China. 

Trump’s team is not the first to try this. Previous administrations have shifted U.S. forces away from the Middle East and Afghanistan, only to send them back. This administration is falling into the same trap, increasing its deployment of assets and personnel to the Middle East over the past year in an effort to deter Iran. Even as the president publicly declares a desire to deescalate and negotiate with Iran, the administration is increasing sanctions and sending thousands of additional U.S. troops to the region.

Publicly announced movements reveal a major swing of forces. Between May and October, the Defense Department deployed about 14,000 more troops to the Persian Gulf region. Immediately after the Soleimani strike, DOD shifted an additional 4,500 troops to the region. These 18,500 personnel represent an almost 30 percent increase over the roughly 60,000 U.S. forces in U.S. Central Command. The Pentagon also moved hardware and assets to the region, including an aircraft carrier strike group, B-52 bombers, early-warning aircraft, maritime patrol planes, MQ-9 Reaper drones, and Patriot missile defense batteries. 

Related: On Iran, It's Time to Return to Containment

Related: The US Recently Made a Smart Move Toward Iran. Killing Soleimani Wasn’t It

Related: Eleven US Troops Were Injured in Jan. 8 Iran Missile Strike

Sending back the Patriots perfectly captures the whip-sawing nature of the administration’s policy. In 2018, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis pulled four batteries out of the region to better align U.S. force posture with the priorities of the NDS. After Iran’s September attacks on two Saudi oil facilities, the Pentagon sent two of them back to Saudi Arabia

None of this appears to be working. Despite the additional forces, Iranian-sourced provocations have continued and escalated. The Iranians or their proxies have attacked oil tankers, a U.S. drone, a critical Saudi refinery, and in December an Iraqi military base, killing an American contractor. After Soleimani’s killing this month, Iran launched missile strikes at two military bases in Iraq. 

Adding conventional forces to the region will not alter the calculus of an adversary whose strategy is to provoke and exhaust the United States and our allies and partners while avoiding all-out conflict. Even when surrounded by 150,000 to 200,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2004 and 2011, Iran continued to pursue nuclear weapons and kill Americans in Iraq with explosively formed penetrators. 

More worrying, the Trump administration’s lurching from crisis to crisis has consequences for America’s readiness to deal with great-power competition and other threats. In the short term, it has derailed the campaign to defeat ISIS, degrade regional terrorist threats, and shift the burden of dealing with them to local security forces. Over the long term, the larger concern is the ability of the Defense Department to deal with China and Russia. 

The NDS, like any actual strategy, demands prioritization and discipline. Absent a decrease in commitments elsewhere, additional deployments to the Gulf will erode the readiness that the Pentagon has rebuilt since 2016. Increasing operations and maintenance spending can halt this erosion, but it will eat into other priorities, particularly research and development and procurement of new weapons systems, as has been the norm in the post-9/11 era. 

Escalating tensions with Iran signals that China and Russia are the priority on paper, but Iran is the real-world priority (tomorrow it might be North Korea again, or Venezuela). This mixed message may make the armed services hedge on their China- and Russia-focused modernization programs. They might ask why they should endure the difficulty of reform and make big bets on future programs only to fight in the Middle East again. 

States in Europe and Asia must observe the situation in the Middle East and doubt the seriousness of our commitment to their regions. Allies and partners may begin to hedge their bets out of fear that the United States will get distracted by — or cause — the next crisis in the Middle East. Neutral states will likely avoid our overtures or shift closer to China or Russia. One can only imagine how India, which is a pillar of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and closely tied to Iran, looks at this crisis. 

For their part, China and Russia are likely celebrating the fact that, after two years during which the United States finally appeared serious about taking them on, U.S. foreign policy is again getting bogged down in the Gulf.

This doesn’t have to be the case. Trump’s instinct is to avoid another war and reduce the U.S. presence in the Middle East. Rather than repeating a failed strategy of using conventional forces to deter Iran from provocations and coerce Iran to change its behavior, the United States should pursue a measured course that seeks attainable policy goals (i.e., not regime change or full “normalization” of the Islamic Republic) using a minimal but capable deterrent military presence alongside our allies and partners, more aggressive covert and proxy actions, continued economic sanctions, and the possibility of real, meaningful negotiation. It is a more sustainable and affordable approach that would allow the administration to avoid being sucked into another “forever war” while remaining tough on Iran and allowing the commander in chief to fill his favored role as negotiator-in-chief. 

NEXT STORY: The US Space Force Is Not a Joke

X
This website uses cookies to enhance user experience and to analyze performance and traffic on our website. We also share information about your use of our site with our social media, advertising and analytics partners. Learn More / Do Not Sell My Personal Information
Accept Cookies
X
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Do Not Sell My Personal Information

When you visit our website, we store cookies on your browser to collect information. The information collected might relate to you, your preferences or your device, and is mostly used to make the site work as you expect it to and to provide a more personalized web experience. However, you can choose not to allow certain types of cookies, which may impact your experience of the site and the services we are able to offer. Click on the different category headings to find out more and change our default settings according to your preference. You cannot opt-out of our First Party Strictly Necessary Cookies as they are deployed in order to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting the cookie banner and remembering your settings, to log into your account, to redirect you when you log out, etc.). For more information about the First and Third Party Cookies used please follow this link.

Allow All Cookies

Manage Consent Preferences

Strictly Necessary Cookies - Always Active

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data, Targeting & Social Media Cookies

Under the California Consumer Privacy Act, you have the right to opt-out of the sale of your personal information to third parties. These cookies collect information for analytics and to personalize your experience with targeted ads. You may exercise your right to opt out of the sale of personal information by using this toggle switch. If you opt out we will not be able to offer you personalised ads and will not hand over your personal information to any third parties. Additionally, you may contact our legal department for further clarification about your rights as a California consumer by using this Exercise My Rights link

If you have enabled privacy controls on your browser (such as a plugin), we have to take that as a valid request to opt-out. Therefore we would not be able to track your activity through the web. This may affect our ability to personalize ads according to your preferences.

Targeting cookies may be set through our site by our advertising partners. They may be used by those companies to build a profile of your interests and show you relevant adverts on other sites. They do not store directly personal information, but are based on uniquely identifying your browser and internet device. If you do not allow these cookies, you will experience less targeted advertising.

Social media cookies are set by a range of social media services that we have added to the site to enable you to share our content with your friends and networks. They are capable of tracking your browser across other sites and building up a profile of your interests. This may impact the content and messages you see on other websites you visit. If you do not allow these cookies you may not be able to use or see these sharing tools.

If you want to opt out of all of our lead reports and lists, please submit a privacy request at our Do Not Sell page.

Save Settings
Cookie Preferences Cookie List

Cookie List

A cookie is a small piece of data (text file) that a website – when visited by a user – asks your browser to store on your device in order to remember information about you, such as your language preference or login information. Those cookies are set by us and called first-party cookies. We also use third-party cookies – which are cookies from a domain different than the domain of the website you are visiting – for our advertising and marketing efforts. More specifically, we use cookies and other tracking technologies for the following purposes:

Strictly Necessary Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Functional Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Performance Cookies

We do not allow you to opt-out of our certain cookies, as they are necessary to ensure the proper functioning of our website (such as prompting our cookie banner and remembering your privacy choices) and/or to monitor site performance. These cookies are not used in a way that constitutes a “sale” of your data under the CCPA. You can set your browser to block or alert you about these cookies, but some parts of the site will not work as intended if you do so. You can usually find these settings in the Options or Preferences menu of your browser. Visit www.allaboutcookies.org to learn more.

Sale of Personal Data

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Social Media Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.

Targeting Cookies

We also use cookies to personalize your experience on our websites, including by determining the most relevant content and advertisements to show you, and to monitor site traffic and performance, so that we may improve our websites and your experience. You may opt out of our use of such cookies (and the associated “sale” of your Personal Information) by using this toggle switch. You will still see some advertising, regardless of your selection. Because we do not track you across different devices, browsers and GEMG properties, your selection will take effect only on this browser, this device and this website.